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RECENT TENDENCIES IN CIVIL LIBERTIES
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
DAVID FELLMAN

The Interests of the Court
The trend of Supreme Court decisions touching upon civil liberties
may be discovered by noting what the Court did during its last term,
1947-48. In many vays the Court's behavior conformed with what may
be regarded now as characteristic traits. Many decisions were 5 to 4
and 6 to 3 votes. Many opinions exceeded the five pages to which judges
should be restricted on penalty of impeachment. Justice Frankfurter,
the prophet of judicial self-restraint, had his say in a large number of
cases, whether as author of the majority opinion, a concurring opinion,
a dissenting opinion, or a concurrence with or dissent from a concurring
opinion and/or a dissenting opinion. And the Court maintained during
this term its special talent for sharp language. Here are a few samples.
Justice Jackson: "To my mind, it is an absurdity to hold that every
farmer who insures his crops knows what the Federal Register contains
or even knows that there is such a publication. If he were to peruse
this voluminous and dull publication as it is issued from time to time
in order to make sure whether anything has been promulgated that
affects his rights, he would never need crop insurance, for he would
never get time to plant any crops."' Chief Justice Vinson: "Criminals
do not normally choose to engage in felonious enterprises before an
audience of police officials."'2 Justice Murphy complained that an interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act was, among other things, "a
pedantically literal reading," and "adherence to formalistic dogmas of
interpretation," "in disregard of reality," and he also reminded the
majority that the statutory provision under dispute was "not just an
exercise in grammar."'3 Justice Frankfurter's pithy aphorisms are scattered all through the opinions of the year: "A trial is not a game of
blind man's buff;" 4 "Federal judges are not referees at prizefights but
functionaries of justice; ' "We cannot as judges be ignorant of that
which is common knowledge to all men;" 6 "There is a difference be1 Dissenting in
Ct. 1, S (1947).
2 Dissenting in
(1948).
8 Dissenting in
(1947).
4 Dissenting in
s Ibid.
6 Dissenting in

Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380, 387, 68 Sup.
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 715, 68 Sup. Ct. 1229, 1237
Morris v. McComb, 332 U. S. 422, 438, 439, 440, 68 Sup. Ct. 131, 139
Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 46, 54, 68 Sup. Ct. 391, 395 (1948).
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 366, 68 Sup. Ct. 1087, 1102 (1948).
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tween reading what is and rewriting it;"' "If it takes nine pages to
determine the scope of a statute, its meaning can hardly be so clear that
he who runs may read, or that even he who reads may read.", Indeed,
it is submitted that his dissenting opinion in Shapiro v. United States,9
a self-incrimination case, reached a new high in judicial invective. To
pursue only one line of thought, he used, inter alia, the following words
and phrases to describe the various parts of the majority opinion: "almost
cursory," "literary freewheeling," "finespun exegesis," "singular interpretation," "sophisticated reading," "extraordinary reading," "Pickwickian,"
"esoteric," "facile treatment," "ready-made catch-phrases," "subtle
question-begging," "startling," and "temerarious pronouncement." Life
seems to be going on as usual in the marble Grecian temple on the
Potomac.
A characteristic of the present Court is the restraint with which it
exercises judicial review in dealing with acts of Congress. Since the
judicial revolution of 1937 got under way, only one act of Congress has
been declared unconstitutional, and it is significant that the case involved
a civil liberty.1 During the past term no federal statute was held invalid.
In case after case the Court affirmed the amplitude of federal power.
Above all, in a series of notable opinions, the Court gave added breadth
and depth to the thrust of the anti-trust laws, and-hence to the scope of
the commerce power. These cases were concerned with the Cement
Institute's multiple basing point delivered price system," a price-agreement policy of California sugar refiners,' 2 the power and sales practices
of motion-picture distributors, 1 and the impact of patents upon the reach
of the anti-trust laws.:" Orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission 5
and the Federal Trade Commission"6 were also sustained, as well as an
extreme application of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of
7 Dissenting in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 43, 68 Sup. Ct. 1375, 1397 (1948).
8 Dissenting in United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689, 705, 68 Sup. Ct. 331, 340 (1948).
9 335 U. S. 1, 36-70, 68 Sup. Ct. 1375, 1393-1410 (1948).

LO United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 66 Sup. Ct. 1073 (1946).
11 Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 68 Sup. Ct. 793 (1948).
12 Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 68 Sup. Ct.
996 (1948).

13 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131, 68 Sup. Ct. 915 (1948);
United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100, 68 Sup. Ct. 941 (1948) ; Schine Chain Theatres v.
United States, 334 U. S. 110, 68 Sup. Ct. 947 (1948).

14 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 68 Sup. Ct. 12 (1947); United
States v. Line Material Co., 333 U. S. 287, 68 Sup. Ct. 550 (1948); United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 68 Sup. Ct. 525 (1948).
15 Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Daniel, 333 U. S. 118, 68 Sup. Ct. 426 (1948); United
States v. B. & 0. R.R., 333 U. S. 169, 68 Sup. Ct. 494 (1948); Morris v. Macomb, 332
U. S. 422, 68 Sup. Ct. 131 (1947).

36 Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 68 Sup. Ct. 822 (1948).
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1938,17 in a variety of situations which further illustrate the broad view
which this Court takes of federal power. However, the Government could
not"8 induce the Court to overrule the interpretation of the commodities
clause of the Interstate Commerce Act advanced in 1936 in the disputed
Elgin case. 9 Nor would the Court enjoin the United States Steel Corporation and its subsidiaries from purchasing the assets of the largest
independent steel fabricator on the West Coast.2" In both cases the vote
was 5 to 4.
The Housing and Rent Act of 1947 was sustained as a valid exercise

of the war power, a power which "does not necessarily end with the
cessation of hostilities." 2'

The power of the government to confiscate

the property of enemy aliens in wartime was also reaffirmed.2 2 However,
the Court avoided deciding the constitutionality of the political contri-

butions and expenditures section of the Taft-Hartley law. It gave the
legislation such an attenuated interpretation that four concurring justices

complained it amounted to an abdication of its function of passing on
the validity of legislation. 3
At the same time the Court sustained, during its last term, a wide

variety of state laws touching upon foreign and interstate commerce,
whether adopted as police 24 or tax25 measures. In our constitutional sys-

tem, the capacity to govern depends, in last analysis, upon what the
judges will permit. Since 1937, following a sociological jurisprudence

and indulging in habits of self-restraint, the Court has gone out of the
business of pitting its judgment against that of Congress and state legislatures as to the wisdom of social and economic legislation. In conse-

quence, there has been-"a vast strengthening of the power to govern,
on the part of both the nation and the states.

28

There was the usual run of cases on various other constitutional
questions. In two full faith and. credit cases the Court managed to muddy
37

United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689, 68 Sup. Ct. 331 (1948).

18 United States v. South Buffalo Ry., 333 U. S. 771, 68 Sup. Ct. 868 (1948).

19 United States v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 298 U. S. 492, 58 Sup. Ct. 841 (1936).
20 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 68 Sup. Ct. 1107 (1948).
21 Woods v. CIoyd W. Miller Co., 333 U. S. 138, 141, 68 Sup. Ct. 421, 423 (1948).
22 Silesian American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U. S. 469, 68 Sup. Ct. 179 (1947).
23 United States v. C.I.O., 335 U. S. 106, 68 Sup. Ct. 1349 (1948).
24 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission of Indiana, 332 U. S.
507, 68 Sup. Ct. 190 (1947); Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28, 68 Sup.
Ct. 358 (1948).
25 Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Commissioners of Montana, 332
U. S. 495, 68 Sup. Ct. 167 (1947); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80,
68 Sup. Ct. 1475 (1948); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 68 Sup. Ct. 1156 (1948);
Central Greyhounds Line v. Mealey, 334 U. S. 653, 68 Sup. Ct. 1260 (1948).
26 Barnett, The Supreme Court and the Capacity to Govern, 63 POL. ScI. Q. 342 (1948).
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still further the murky waters of the law dealing with divorces.27 The
"brooding omnipresence" of the Tompkins rule 28 appeared in two interesting decisions.29 In a case touching upon the liability of a federal
governmental corporation, the Court added to the citizen's obligation
of knowing what is in the United States Statutes at Large the additional
responsibility of keeping up with the rules and regulations appearing in
the Federal Aegister. ° In two cases the Court struggled with- the question as to what constitutes an advisory opinion. 31 The War Contracts
Renegotiation Act was sustained against the objection that it unconstitutionally delegated legislative power 2 And a claim to exemption from
a state inheritance tax of property held in trust by the United States for
the benefit of a restricted Osage Indian was rejected.'
How, then, did the Court spend its time during the past term?
The answer is that much of its energy was devoted to the broad
field of civil liberties. This is a civil-liberties minded court, and
many of its important decisions reflect this interest. This is well
illustrated in the Bob-Lo case. 4 The Court held that the Michigan Civil Rights Act, which requires full and equal accommodations on all public conveyances, applies to the transportation of passengers by boat from Detroit to the city's Coney Island, Bois Blanc Island
(commonly referred to as Bob-Lo), which is located in Canadian waters.
Here the amusement company refused altogether to carry Negro passengers, and was convicted of violating the state law. A majority of the
Court agreed that this transportation is undoubtedly foreign commerce,
but that it is also of "highly local concern," since economically and
socially the island is an amusement adjunct of Detroit. The case comes
within the Cooley rule35 therefore, which applies to both interstate and
foreign commerce. The main problem before the Court was to explain
away Hall v. De Cuir,6 decided in 1878, which held that a state may
not require equal accommodations in public carriers engaged in inter27 Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 68 Sup. Ct. 1213 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334
U. S. 343, 68 Sup. 1087 (1948); Note, 34 CoRNeELL L. Q. 263 (1948).

28 The phrase is that of judge Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts; The
Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L. J. 267 (1946).
29 King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U. S. 153, 68 Sup. Ct. 488 (1948);
Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U. S. 445, 68 Sup. Ct. 611 (1948).
30 Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380, 68 Sup. Ct. 1 (1947).
31 Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 68 Sup. Ct. 431
(1948); Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, Cal., 333 U. S. 426, 68 Sup. Ct. 641
(1948).
32 Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 68 Sup. Ct. 1294 (1948).
33 West v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 334 U. S. 717, 68 Sup. Ct. 1223 (1948).
34 Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28, 68 Sup. Ct. 358 (1948).
35 Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851).
36 95 U. S. 485 (1877).
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state commerce, and Morgan v. Virginia,37 decided in 1946, which held
that a state may not constitutionally segregate white and colored passengers on busses moving interstate, this being an undue burden on interstate commerce. Justice Rutledge, speaking for the Court, distinguished
these precedents, mainly by emphasizing the degree of localization of
this commerce in the Bob-Lo case and the fact that it dealt with a complete exclusion from passage. Justice Jackson, with whom the Chief
Justice agreed, dissented on the ground that the De Cuir and Morgan
cases have committed the court to the rule that it will not permit local
policies to burden national and foreign commerce. Justice Jackson complained that the Court conceded that this commerce is foreign commerce,
but upheld the state policy "on the ground that it is not very foreign,"
and did not lay down any standard by which to judge "when foreign
commerce is foreign enough to become free of local regulation." In the
absence of criteria, all is left "to case-by-case conjecture," and he tartly
remarked: "The commerce clause was intended to promote commerce
rather than litigation."
What does all this add up to? It seems to come to this: that a state
Jim Crow law is bad, and a state equal rights law is good. Therefore the
former is an undue burden on interstate commerce, while the latter is not.
Right to Equal Protection of the Laws
Some of the weightiest decisions of the last term of Court dealt with
one of the most fundamental of all civil rights, the right to the equal
protection of the laws. Pre-eminent among them are the cases dealing
with that species of incorporeal hereditaments known as restrictive
covenants. In the Shelley case,38 a unanimous Court of six judges held
that it is a denial of the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment for a state court to enforce such covenants. This case was
a joinder of two actions, one from St. Louis and the other from Detroit,
both dealing with covenants barring the sale of real estate to Negroes.
It cannot be doubted, the Court declared, that among the civil rights
which are protected against discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment is the right to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property.
While this Amendment does not inhibit merely private conduct, but only
state action, action of state courts is state action. There is state action
here in the full and complete sense of the word, and not merely a failure
37 328 U. S. 373, 66 Sup. Ct. 1050 (1945).

3S8Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836 (1948).
which appeared as anicus, has been published:

The brief of the government,

CLARKE AND PERLmrA,

PROPERTY (Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1948).

PREUticE AND
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to act, for the state makes available, in the enforcement of these restrictive covenants, "the full coercive power of government." In a companion case, 9 the Court held that the federal courts of the District of
Columbia may not enforce such covenants running with land in the city
of Washington. The Court did not decide the case, however, on the
basis of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, but preferred
to rule that such covenants were forbidden by the first clause of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. But even in the absence of this statute, the
Court believed that it would not be "consistent with the public policy
of the United States to permit federal courts in the Nation's capital to
exercise general equitable powers to compel action denied the state
courts. . .

."

A concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter emphasized

this last point, that "equity is rooted in conscience," and that an injunction is always an extraordinary remedy granted, not as a matter of right,
but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion.
Another important decision involving the equal protection of the laws
was the Oklahoma case ° in which a unanimous Court ruled that a Negro
is entitled to secure legal education afforded by a state institution, and
that the state must provide it as soon as it does so for any other group.
Finally, two very significant decisions involving Japanese aliens and
Japanese-Americans in California came up for disposition. In the Oyama
case,4 the Court held that the California Alien Land Law, insofar as it
prevented an ineligible alien from buying land in behalf of his nativeborn son, denies that son the equal protection of the laws and one of
his privileges as an American citizen. A conveyance to the son, under
the statute, is under the handicap of a presumption in favor of escheat
to the state which is not true for conveyances to other minor donees in
California. The Court refused to say, however, that it is unconstitutional
for a state to forbid the ownership of land by ineligible aliens, and thus
declined to reexamine the alien land law cases of 1923.2 Chief Justice
Vinson, speaking for the Court, declared that discrimination between
citizens on the basis of their racial descent is not justifiable, and the
Hirabayashicase was explained away as a war measure. Justices Black
and Douglas, concurring, preferred the broader ground that the California
39 Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 68 Sup. Ct. 847 (1948); Note, 33 CORNELL L. Q. 293
(1947).
40 Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 332 U. S. 631, 68 Sup. Ct.
299 (1948).
41 Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 68 Sup. Ct. 269 (1948).
42 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 44 Sup. Ct. 15 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263
U. S. 225, 44 Sup. Ct. 21 (1923) ; Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U. S. 313, 44 Sup. Ct. 112 (1923);
Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 326, 44 Sup. Ct. 115 (1923).
43 Hirabayashj v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 63 Sup. Ct. 1375 (1943).

1949]

CIVIL LIBERTIES

Alien Land Law violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment .and conflicts with federal laws and treaties governing the
immigration of aliens and their rights in this country. They drew special
attention to our obligations under the United Nations Charter. Justices
Murphy and Rutledge also concurred separately, arguing that on its
face this statute is unconstitutional, that a state may not legally deny
an ineligible alien the right to own agricultural land, and that the Constitution is uncompromisingly opposed to racism in any form. In a masterful analysis of the various arguments commonly resorted to for justification of this sort of legislation, Justice Murphy demonstrated that a
rational basis for this discrimination was completely lacking. Justices
Reed, Burton and Jackson dissented, all calling attention to the fact that
the real issue is whether a state may deny land-ownership to ineligible
aliens. It follows that only Vinson and Frankfurter insisted on ducking
the real issue, but at least one of their votes was necessary to arrive at
any decision in favor of Oyama.
The Takahashicase44 held unconstitutional a California law prohibiting
the issuance of licenses for commercial fishing to ineligible aliens. At
last a majority of the Court (seven judges) finally got around to declaring that it does not follow from the fact that in regulating immigration
and naturalization Congress makes classifications on the basis of race
and color, that a state can adopt one or more of the same classifications
to prevent lawfully-admitted aliens within its borders from earning a
living in the same way that other state inhabitants earn their living.
The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment and a section of the
Enforcement Act of 1870, protect "all persons" against this sort of discrimination. The alien land law cases of 1923, "assuming the continued
validity of those cases" (an invitation to litigation), are not controlling
here, since they rested on reasons "peculiar to real property." Reed and
Jackson dissented on the old theory that natural resources are in some
special sense the property of the sovereign state, which it may preserve
from exploitation by aliens.
Free Speech and Press Cases
There were several free speech and press cases during the past term
of Court. By a 5 to 4 vote, the Court ruled, in Saia v. New York,4 that
a city ordinance forbidding the use of sound amplification devices except
in the undefined discretion of the Chief of Police, is unconstitutional on
44 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U. S. 410, 68 Sup. Ct. 1138'(1948).
45 334 U. S. 558, 68 Sup. Ct. 1148 (1948).
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its face, for it establishes a previous restraint on the right of free speech.
The plaintiff was a Jehovah Witness. Justice Douglas declared:
"Loud-speakers are today indispensable instruments of effective
public speech. The sound truck has become an accepted method of
political campaigning. It is the way people are reached. Must a
candidate for governor or the Congress depend on the whim or
caprice of the Chief of Police in order to use his sound truck for
campaigning?- Must he prove to the satisfaction of that official that
his noise will not be annoying to people?"
The state, however, may regulate the noise by regulating decibels, and
may control the hours and places of public discussion.
"Courts must balance the various community interests in passing
on the constitutionality of local regulations of the character involved
here. But in that process they should be mindful to keep the freedoms of the First Amendment in a preferred position."
Four judges dissented. Justice Frankfurter argued with considerable
heat for protection against "aural aggression," and in favor of the right
to privacy. In Justice Jackson's view this is not a free speech issue at
all; he warned against endangering the great right of free speech "by
making it ridiculous and obnoxious."
In Winters v. New York 46 a majority of six held unconstitutional a
New York law forbidding the printing or selling of any book, pamphlet,
magazine or newspaper which is "principally made up of criminal news,
police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of
bloodshed, lust or crime." A New York City bookseller was found guilty
of a misdemeanor for selling a magazine called "Headquarters Detective."
The Court noted that "the principle of a free press covers distribution
as well as publication," and then ruled that even as interpreted by the
New York Court of Appeals, the statute was so vague and indefinite as
to be contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court ordinarily
goes far to uphold state statutes that deal with offenses which are difficult
to define, this is not true when they involve limitations on free expression.
The Court refused to accept the argument that the constitutional protection of a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas, for "the
line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive." Justice
Frankfurter wrote a characteristically vigorous dissenting opinion, arguing that the standard of "indefiniteness" is itself indefinite, and complaining that the Court discussed this case only in the abstract, without
considering the actual magazine involved. This, he said, is like playing
Hamlet without Hamlet.
46 333

U.

S. 507, 68 Sup. Ct. 665 (1948).
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In United States v. C.I.O.,47 the Court construed § 304 of the TaftHartley Act in such fashion as to hold for the defendant without ruling
on its constitutionality. The majority did say, however, that if this
statute forbade a union from advising its members, in the regular course
of affairs, as to public measures and elections, there would be "the gravest
doubt" as to its constitutionality. Four concurring judges said the Court
had abdicated its function of passing on the validity of the Act. In their
judgment, the Act unconstitutionally limited "the expression of bloc
sentiment." In another case, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine first announced in 1904 in Public ClearingHouse v. Coyne,4 8 that Congress may
use its postal power to bar the use of the mails for fraudulent purposes,
and rejected the argument that recent decisions have undermined the
philosophy of that historic precedent.4 9 There is not "the slightest support for a contention that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press include complete freedom, uncontrollable
by Congress, to use the mails for perpetuation of swindling schemes."
The Court sustained a decree against the big distributors of motion pictures, but made it clear that "we have no doubt that moving pictures,
like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is
guaranteed by the First Amendment.""5 In a case from Utah, a conviction
for the offense of conspiring to counsel and practice polygamy was set
aside because, in the Court's judgment, the statute lacked reasonable
standards of guilt, and the case was remanded to give the state court a
chance to define its scope.5 Justices Rutledge, Murphy, Douglas thought
that since the statute punished mere advocacy, it presented a free speech
issue; in a democracy, they thought, people should be free to discuss and
advocate polygamy.
In Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion in the C.I.O. case there is a
good statement of the present Court's basic philosophy concerning freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment:
"As the Court has declared repeatedly, that [the legislative] judgment does not bear the same weight and is not entitled to the same
presumption of validity, when the legislation on its face or in specific
application restricts the rights of conscience, expression and assembly
protected.by the Amendment, as are given to other regulations having
no such tendency. The presumption rather is against the legislative
47 335 U. S. 106, 68 Sup. Ct. 1349 (1948).
48 194 U. S. 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 789 (1904).
49 Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U. S. 178, 68 Sup. Ct. 591 (1948).
50 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131, 166, 68 Sup. Ct. 91,
(1948).
51 Musser v. Utah, 333 U. S. 95, 68 Sup. Ct. 397 (1948).

933
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intrusion into these domains. For, while not absolute, the enforced
surrender of those rights must be justified by the existence and
immediate impendency of dangers to the public interest which clearly
and not dubiously outweigh those involved in the restrictions upon
the very foundation of democratic institutions, grounded as those
institutions are in the freedoms of religion, conscience, expression
and assembly. Hence doubtful intrusions cannot be allowed to stand
consistently with the Amendment's command and purpose, nor
therefore can the usual presumptions of constitutional validity,
deriving from the weight of legislative opinion in other matters more
largely within the legislative province and special competence,
obtain.""2
And there are, Justice Rutledge added, "corollary principles" which are
equally well-settled with regard to First Amendment freedoms:
"These are that statutes restrictive of or purporting to place
limits to those freedoms must be narrowly drawn to meet the precise
evil the legislature seeks to curb,... and that the conduct proscribed
must be defined specifically so that the person or persons affected
remain secure and unrestrained in their rights to engage in activities
not encompassed by the legislation. Blurred signposts to criminality
will not suffice to create it."
Religious Freedom
There was one case during the term which squarely raised a major
issue of religious freedom. It involved Vashti McCollum's objections to
the Champaign, Illinois, school board's program of religious instruction
in the public schools on a "released time" basis. 3 Under this plan, religious teachers employed by private religious groups were permitted to
give religious instruction during the last thirty minutes of the school day
in the school buildings to those pupils whose parents had consented in
writing, at no public expense. Eight justices agreed to a decree reversing
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, which had sustained the
program, but it was almost buried under a welter of opinions. Jackson
preferred Frankfurter's to Black's, Frankfurter preferred Frankfurter's
to Black's, and Black Black's to Frankfurter's; for good measure, Jackson
concurred separately, in the expression of views that no one else seemed
to share at the moment. All eight judges agreed, however, that the "released time" plan of religious instruction was a violation of the principle of the separation of church and state embedded in the First Amendment, and made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth. Justice Black
52 335 U. S. 106, 140-42, 68 Sup. Ct. 1349, 1366-67 (1948).

53 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 68 Sup. Ct. 461
(1948).
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denied that the Court's opinion was evidence of hostility to religion.
In words which Roger Williams could have written, he declared: " . . .
the First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from
the other within its respective sphere." Here the state not only allows
sectarian groups to use tax-supported public school buildings, but also
helps to provide pupils for their religious classes. "This is not separation
of Church and State." Returning to a theme which he elaborated in the
flag salute cases,"' Justice Frankfurter developed a line of thought which
is well-summarized in the following sentence: "Designed to serve as
perhaps the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a
heterogeneous democratic people, the public school must keep scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of sects." Justice Jackson
doubted whether the Court should have taken jurisdiction at all, expressing the fear that this decision would start a flood of litigations
against local school boards. Justice Reed dissented, emphasizing mainly
the fact that there are many governmental aids to religion, such as tax
exemption, free textbooks, free lunches, and bible-reading. He did not
believe that the Constitution forbids "every friendly gesture between
church and state." It is difficult to reconcile this case with the New Jersey school-bus case,55 though it is interesting to note that the Everson
case was decided 5 to 4, whereas the vote here was 8 to 1.Y
There was another case involving Jehovah's Witnesses, in which
three of them were denied classification by their draft boards as ministers
of religion.57 Five judges held that the scope of judicial review to which
these men were entitled is extremely limited, and that it was not error
for the trial court to refuse to submit the issue of the appropriateness
of the classification to the jury. The constitutional right to jury trial
does not include the right to have the jury pass on the validity of an
administrative order, or to introduce new evidence at the trial. Douglas
and Black dissented on the ground that the local boards had no adequate
basis for denying these men the classification of minister; Murphy
54 Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010 (1940); West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 63 Sup. Ct. 1178 (1943).
55 Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 U. S. 1, 67 Sup. Ct. 504 (1947),
Note, 33 CoanrL L. Q. 122.
56 The McCollum decision was bitterly denounced by the Administrative Board of the
National Catholic Welfare Conference in a statement published on November 20, 1948, over
the signatures of the four American cardinals and ten archbishops and bishops. They
declared that it represented a victory for "doctrinaire secularism," and that it set forth
"an entirely novel and ominously extensive interpretation" of the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment. The majority opinions, they asserted, "pay scant
attention to logic, history, or accepted norms of legal interpretation."
57 Cox v. United States, 332 U. S. 442, 68 Sup. Ct. 115 (1947).
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and Rutledge dissented on the theory that where a claim to freedom
of conscience and religion is involved, there should be allowed a greater
measure of judicial review.
Rights of Defendants in Criminal Cases
There were several cases during the term touching upon the right
to jury trial. In Moore v. New York58 a majority of five upheld the
conviction of two Negroes for first degree murder by a special or "blue
ribbon" jury. It was admitted that in the special jury panel of 150 names,
from which this jury was drawn, there were no Negroes. The Court refused to disturb the very recent holding in the Fay case,59 and held that
the fact that there were no Negroes in this panel is not conclusive evidence
of unconstitutionality without proof that Negroes were intentionally
and systematically excluded. Four justices, speaking through Justice
Murphy, protested that the "blue ribbon" jury is tainted by the very
fact that it is not chosen from a fair cross-section of the community.
This "contradicts the most elementary notions of equal protection."
Whether Negroes are systematically and intentionally excluded is, therefore, quite beside the point, since the vice lies in the very concept of
"blue ribbon" panels.
A unanimous court set aside the conviction of a Negro in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County, Mississippi, by an all-white jury, following an indictment by an all-white grand jury." The evidence showed
that, in a county in which over one-third of the population is colored,
no Negro had served on any jury for over 30 years. This, the Court
thought, was proof enough of systematic exclusion, and in any event, in
the face of such a showing, it becomes the duty of the state to show
that such exclusion was due to some reason other than racial discrimination.
In a case coming from the District Court of Hawaii, the Court ruled
that wherever the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply, the requirement of unanimity extends to all issues, the nature of the punishment as
well as the question of guilt; left to the jury.",
Michigan's unique "one-man grand jury system," under which the
judge may order summary commitment for contempt if, in the course of
secret hearings, he believes a witness has given false, evasive or deliber58 333 U.
59 Fay v.
272.
00 Patton
61 Andres

S. 565, 68 Sup. Ct. 705 (1948).
New York, 332 U. S. 261, 67 Sup. Ct. 1613 (1947), Note, 33 CoRNEM L.
v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463, 68 Sup. Ct. 184 (1947).
v. United States, 333 U. S. 740, 68 Sup. Ct. 880 (1948).
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ately contradictory evidence, was held lacking in due process because of
the secrecy of the proceedings and the denial of a reasonable opportunity
to be heard. 62 The accused is always entitled to a public trial. Similarly,
where one has been convicted of violating § 2 of a criminal statute, and
the state supreme court, on appeal, affirms on the ground that the evidence warranted a conviction under § 1, the defendant has been denied
due process. 63 Clearly, procedural due process means that one has a
right to notice of a specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial
of the issues raised by that charge. But in a New York case, the Court
held that where one was indicted for larceny, and pleaded guilty to a
reduced charge of attempted larceny, "it would be exaltation of technical
precision to an unwarranted degree" to say that the defendant was not
given sufficient notice of the charge against him.64
There are three civil liberties issues concerning the rights of persons
accused of crime which have in recent years been the subject of an immense amount of opinion-writing: self-incrimination, searches and
seizures, and the right to counsel. The last term of Court had its full
share of cases dealing with these problems.
There were five important right-to-counsel cases. One may be forgiven for hesitating to plunge into this legal thicket, however briefly.
The long, complicated series of cases since the Scottsboro case in 193265
does not lend itself to a simple and straightforward analysis. One suspects
that on this subject the wavering of the Court arises from the fact that
on the one hand it believes as a matter of principle that a defendant in
a criminal case should ordinarily have a lawyer, while on the other hand
it is often appalled at the Pandora's box it has opened in so declaring,
for the jails are filled with residents itching to take one more shot at a
writ of habeas corpus. In the hard cases of the last term on the right
to counsel, three were decided by 5 to 4 votes and two by 6 to 3 votes.
Considering the large number of cases the Court has had on this subject
since 193.2, it is a bit surprising that so much room is still left for basic
disagreement.
One of these, Bute v. Illinois,6" is worth some special attention as to
one of its aspects. The main point made in Justice Burton's opinion,
for a majority of five, was that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment does not necessarily require in the state courts exactly what the
62 In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 68 Sup. Ct. 499 (1948).
63 Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196, 68 Sup. Ct. 514 (1948).

64 Paterno v. Lyons, 334 U. S. 314, 321, 68 Sup. Ct. 1044, 1047 (1948).
6 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 53 Sup. Ct. 55 (1932).
66 333 U. S. 640, 68 Sup. Ct. 763 (1948).
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Sixth Amendment requires in the federal courts. On the other hand,
Justice Douglas argued that all the provisions of the federal Bill of
Rights are applicable in all American courts, state and national, at all
times. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment should be regarded as
having absorbed all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights is one of the
most absorbing subjects of dispute in the present court.6 7 The point
was fully debated in 1947 by Justices Frankfurter and Black in the
Adamson case.6" The division in the Adamson and Bute cases was identical. Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge are committed to
the proposition that all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are included
in the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of due process of law; they
need one more vote.
Here are some of the propositions established on the subject of the
right to counsel during the last term of Court:
(1) In a noncapital felony case in a state court, due process does
not demand that the defendant be given the assistance of counsel unless
there are special circumstances showing that without counsel the defendant would not have a fair trial.69 It is difficult to discover any rule of
reason in Justice Burton's distinction between capital and noncapital
cases.
(2) On the other hand: "There are some individuals who, by
reason of age, ignorance or mental capacity are incapable of representing themselves adequately in a prosecution of a relatively simple
nature. This incapacity is purely personal and can be determined only
by an examination and observation of the individual. Where such incapacity is present, the refusal to appoint counsel is a denial of due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 70
(3) Due process has not been denied if a state judge fails to offer
counsel, in a noncapital case, to a defendant who had been a defendant
on eight previous occasions, and for whom counsel had twice conducted
defenses. It may be presumed that he was aware of his right to counsel
and waived it by failing to ask for an appointment.71
(4) A federal court should not accept a waiver of counsel without
being satisfied that the defendant fully comprehends what he is doing.
67 Justice Rutledge made a similar argument, at considerable length, in a concurring
opinion in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 279-83, 68 Sup. Ct. 499, 510-12 (1948), the case
dealing with Michigan's "one-man grand jury."
68 Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672 (1947).
69 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 68 Sup. Ct. 763 (1948). Special circumstances requiring
counsel in a noncapital case were found in Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 68 Sup. Ct.
1252 (1948).

70 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672, 684, 68 Sup. Ct. 1270, 1276 (1948).
71 Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728, 68 Sup. Ct. 1256 (1948).
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The duty of a federal judge to make a thorough inquiry into the matter
and to see that this right is given th fullest protection at every stage of
the proceedings is a "solemn duty" and not "a mere procedural formality." 2 Waiver must be intelligent and competent, and there is a
"strong presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel," which is not overcome by the fact that in a mere routine inquiry
the judge asked a few standard questions.
There were three search and seizure cases during the term, and
the defendant won in each. Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Black dissented in all three cases, in two of which Justices Burton and Reed joined
them. Justice Jackson wrote two of the three majority opinions. The
Court dispelled the notion that an automobile is more vulnerable than
other property to search without a warrant.73 That belief is rooted in
a misunderstanding of the Carroll case.7 But even if there is a right of
car search without a warrant, that does not include the person of occupants, any more than the right to search a residence confers the right to
search all persons found in it. Of course, lawful arrest makes an ensuing
search permissible, but the lawfulness of the arrest cannot be made to
depend upon what turns up in the search. Nor is an arrest lawful because
the defendant did not protest or resist it, for "courts will hardly penalize
failure to display a spirit of resistance or to hold futile debates on legal
issues in the public highway with an officer of the law."
In the absence of exceptional circumstances a search warrant may not
be dispensed with. Mere inconvenience to the officers and some slight
delay, to prepare papers and present evidence to a magistrate, "are
never very convincing reasons," especially when nothing would have
been lost if the amenities had been observed.7 5 It is best as a rule to
insist that a judicial officer and not a policeman should decide when the
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search.
The Court underscored the proposition that "it is a cardinal rule that,
in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and
use search warrants wherever reasonably practicable. ' 76 The right to
search or seize without a warrant is a strictly limited right, and the
mere fact, therefore, of a lawful arrest does not ipso facto legalize a
search without a warrant.
There were four self-incrimination cases under review. In a case involving an alleged sex offense in Mississippi, a unanimous Court ruled
72 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708, 722, 68 Sup. Ct. 316, 322 (1948).
73 United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 68 Sup. Ct. 222 (1948).
74 Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280 (1925).
75 Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 68 Sup. Ct. 367 (1948).

76 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 705, 68 Sup. Ct. 1229, 1232 (1948).
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that in a state criminal proceeding a defendant does not lose the right
to contend that a confession was coerced because at some point he testified that a confession had never in fact been made.77 As for the other
cases, a conviction was set aside in one by a 5 to 4 vote,"8 and the defendant lost in the other two by votes of 5 to 4 and 5 to 3.11 The majority ruled:
(1) Where a Negro boy of 15 makes a confession after questioning
from midnight to 5 A.M., without counsel or any other kind of assistance,
a court will scrutinize the record with special care. In this case, though
he concurred in the judgment, Justice Frankfurter found it necessary to
append an essay on judicial humility, because due process is such a
Cgossamer concept." He finally lifted the burden on his conscience by
concluding that what happened in this case was in conflict "with deeply
rooted feelings of the community." It followed therefore, in his judgment, that he was making no subjective judgment; he was applying an
objective standard.8 °
(2) The United States Supreme Court should go slow in reversing
a deliberate judgment of the state courts on a question of the validity
of a confession, for such a judgment is .presumptively valid and should
not be set aside on review unless patently arbitrary.8 '
(3) A statutory immunity from prosecution written into the Emergency Price Control Act was very strictly construed by a narrow majority to go no farther than the constitutional immunity itself. The
Court went on to make the very questionable ruling that all records and
documents required by any valid regulatory law are public documents,
as to which no constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
attaches.8"
Habeas Corpus Procedure
The Supreme Court ruled that a Circuit Court of Appeals has the
power to command that a federal prisoner be brought before it so that
he may argue his own appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding, though its
power to do so is discretionary, since oral argument on appeal is not an
essential ingredient of due process. The Court also held that it was improper for the District Court to dismiss a fourth petition for habeas
corpus, which for the first time alleged that the prosecution had know77 Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 742, 68 Sup. Ct. 300 (1948).
78 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 68 Sup. Ct. 302 (1948).
79 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 1375 (1948); Taylor v. Alabama,
335 U. S. 252, 68 Sup. Ct. 1415 (1948).
80 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 68 Sup. Ct. 302 (1948).
81 Taylor v. Alabama, 335 U. S. 252, 68 Sup. Ct. 1415 (1948).
82 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 1375 (1948).
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ingly used false testimony to obtain a conviction, without at least giving
him an opportunity to explain why he had not raised the issue previously.
Four judges dissented.8'
There were also several cases dealing with the difficult procedural
issues which are raised in our courts because of our complicated federal
system. In one of them the Court ruled that if two courses of action
for appeal are available to a defendant who has been convicted in a state
trial court, and he has exhausted one of the routes, he has done all he
can to secure a determination of his claim by the state courts, and may
then apply for habeas corpus in a federal district court.84 Furthermore,
failure to seek a review in the United States Supreme Court of the state
court's denial of habeas corpus does not make it improper for the
federal district court to entertain his petition; there is no hard and fast
rule that one must go directly to the United States Supreme Court, in
view especially of the volume of this Court's business and the fact that
writs of certiorari are matters of grace. Generally speaking, habeas
corpus procedure must be kept as flexible as possible. The Court brushed
aside, as a "discredited fear," the notion that this would give rise to many
cases in which a single federal judge will upset the judgments of the
highest state courts. For the fiscal years 1943, 1944 and 1945, statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
show that an average of 451 habeas corpus petitions were filed each year
in federal district courts by prisoners serving state court sentences, and
of these, an average of only six per year resulted in a release of the
prisoner. Four judges dissented on the theory that respect for our federal system requires that federal courts interfere with state cases "only
in exceptional circumstances."
In connection with these decisions, mention should be made here of
the recent revision by Congress of Title 28 of the United States Code, 5
dealing with the judiciary and judicial procedure, with its new and revised rules of statute law on the subject of habeas corpus. These rules
are the product of a great deal of experience in the courts, and should
help to prevent the abuse of the writ that some of the judges seem to fear.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court interpreted two sections of the federal deportation statutes in favor of the alien parties.
Neither case involved a constitutional issue, however, and both decisions
were unanimous.88
83 Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 68 Sup. Ct. 1049 (1948).
84 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672, 68 Sup. Ct. 1270 (1948).
85 Pub. L. No. 773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 25, 1948). The habeas corpus sections
are §§ 2241-55.
80 Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388, 68 Sup. Ct. 10 (1947); Tan v. Phelan,
333 U. S. 6, 68 Sup. Ct. 374 (1948).
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Conclusions
What conclusions may be drawn from this brief'review of the cases
decided in the last term of court?
(1) The Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to use either
the Commerce Clause or the Due Process clauses of the Constitution
to invalidate state or 'national regulation of the economy. Here it practises self-restraint. But it makes use of its powers of judicial review
freely when civil liberties are at stake. Thus the Court used the Commerce Clause to invalidate the California anti-Okie law in the Edwards
case,8 7 and the Virginia Jim Crow law in the Morgan case; 8 8 on the
other hand, and still consistently with its civil liberties bent, it sustained
the application of Michigan's equal rights law to a phase of foreign com9
merce in the Bob-Lo case.8
(2) The debate as to whether the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to embrace all rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights goes on,
and the justices are still divided on this basic question 5 to 4. Five
9" and
justices still cling to the rule of the Hurtado
Twining 1 cases, that
only the most fundamental sections of the Bill of Rights, those which, in
the words of Justice Cardozo, are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,"9 2 should be absorbed into the due process concept. The fact
that the minority view would invalidate indictment by information in the
states, and revive the grand jury, an almost obsolete institution, may
very well be the decisive reason for not overruling the position the Court
has always maintained on this important point.
3. The present Court is firmly committed to the proposition that the
First Amendment liberties have a preferred place in our constitutional
law. It holds that the normal presumption in favor of the constitutionality of legislation does not exist for statutes which on their face invade
one of these freedoms, and the "clear and present danger" standard for
testing the validity of limitations on these freedoms has been underscored.9 3 Perhaps the chief feature of the decisions of the last term was
the Court's emphasis upon the doctrine that crimes must be defined with
87 Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 62 Sup. Ct. 164 (1941).

88 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, 66 Sup. Ct. 1050 (1946).
89 Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28, 68 Sup. Ct. 358 (1948).
90 Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. 111 (1884).
91 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (1908).

The point at issue

was reargued and the rule reaffirmed in Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 67 Sup. Ct.
1672 (1947).
92 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 58 Sup. Ct. 149, 152 (1937).

93 For a recent criticism of the "clear and present danger" standard by a notable champion of freedom of expression see MEKEjonN, FREE SPEECH3 AD ITs RELA7ION TO SELF'-

GovERNmw

(1948).
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specificity. It took the view that criminal statutes touching upon First
Amendment freedoms must be drawn narrowly, with special care and
precision and that legislatures in this area will be held to higher standards
of bill-draftsmanship than are normally demanded of them.
(4) The Court has had an usually large number of cases since 1938
dealing with freedom of religion. Most of these cases were brought to the
Court by Jehovah's Witnesses. In fact, during the past decade the Court
has had to rethink the whole question of freedom of religion. The Witnesses brought only two cases to the Supreme Court during the last term,
and neither involved religious freedom as the central issue." The principal case on this subject was the McCollum case95 which has stirred up
an immense amount of public discussion.
(5) The Court has had a very notable series 6f decisions during the
past ten years or so touching upon the equal protection of the laws, and
especially various aspects of the problem of racial discrimination. In
this area the Court wrote some distinguished opinions last year: in the
restricted covenants cases, the California alien land law and commercial
fishing cases, the Oklahoma law school case, and the Bob-Lo case. 6
(6) The Court has progressively enlarged the number of subjects
falling within the scope of freedom of speech and press. For example,
the right to criticize courts has been expanded, and the power of courts
to punish through contempt proceedings has been constricted. 97 Freedom of speech and press include the distribution of pamphlets and
leaflets9" and peaceful picketing.99 Freedom from postal censorship has
been underscored. 00 Deportation and denaturalization statutes have
been interpreted strictly in favor of the widest possible margins of free
discussion and belief.' 0 1 Cases on some of these subjects came up in the
94 One dealt with loudspeakers, Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558, 68 Sup. Ct. 1148
(1948), and the other with the scope of judicial review, Cox v. United States, 332 U. S.
442, 68 Sup. Ct. 115 (1947).
95 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 68 Sup. Ct. 461 (1948).
98 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S.
24, 68 Sup. Ct. 847 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 68 Sup. Ct 269 (1948);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U. S. 410, 68 Sup. Ct. 1138 (1948); Sipuel v.
Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 332 U. S. 631, 68 Sup. Ct. 299 (1948); Bob-Lo
Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28, 68 Sup. Ct. 358 (1948).
97 Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 62 Sup. Ct. 190 (1941) ; Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U. S. 331, 66 Sup. Ct. 1029 (1946) ; Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 67 Sup. Ct. 1249
(1947).
98 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938); Schneider v. Irvington, 308
U. S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146 (1939).
99 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940); Carlson v. California,
310 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 746 (1940).
100 Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U. S. 146, 66 Sup. Ct. 456 (1946).
101 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 65 Sup. Ct. 1443 (1945); Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U. S. 118, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333 (1943); Baumgartner v. United States, 322
U. S. 665, 64 Sup. Ct. 1240 (1944).
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last term-the New York detective-story magazine case, for example 2
-and to the list as a whole must now be added loudspeakers 3 ,
(7)
The least satisfactory state of affairs exists in the tangled area
of rules dealing with the rights of persons accused of crime. The reaffirmation of the validity of the "blue ribbon" jury system represents a
decision which many students of American institutions will deplore. 14
On the other hand, the Court applied once more its now familiar rule
that it is unconstitutional for a state intentionally and systematically to
exclude Negroes from grand or petit juries. 105 The Michigan "one-man"
grand jury system was properly disposed of. 0 6 Much of the old confusion on such subjects as the right to counsel and freedom from sellincrimination goes on, and the law dealing with searches and seizures,
now as always, is a mystery.107
In the perspective of the decisions of the past decade, three types of
cases were missing from last year's output:
(1) There were no cases dealing with direct federal protection of
civil rights, as in the Classic and Screws cases.' S No new ground was
broken by the Supreme Court on this important subject in the last term.
(2) There were no cases growing out of war or the exercises of power
by the military authorities, such as those dealing with the JapaneseAmericans. 9 Cases testing wartime authority seem to have run out.
(3)
There were no cases dealing with the right to vote and with
elections. Here the white primary cases have made a notable contribution to American constitutional law." 0 It is noteworthy, however, that
on April 19, 1948, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Rice v. Elmore,"' thus making final the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals," 2 which held that the Democratic Party of South Carolina is
not "a mere private aggregation of individuals, like a country club"
102 Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 66 Sup. Ct. 665 (1948).
103 Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558, 68 Sup. Ct. 1148 (1948).
104 Moore v. New York, 333 U. S. 565, 68 Sup. Ct. 705 (1948).
105 Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463, 68 Sup. Ct. 184 (1947).
106 In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 68 Sup. Ct. 499 (1948).
107 See PanXcnnrr, THE ROO SVELT COURT, c. 6 (1948).
108 United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031 (1941); Screws v. United
States, 325 U. S.91, 65 Sup. Ct. 1031 (1945). See CaRR, FEERAL PROTCTION oF Cxv
RiGHTs (1947).
109 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 63 Sup. Ct. 1375 (1943) ; Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U. S. 214, 65 Sup. Ct. 193 (1944). See'CoRwiN, TOTAL WAR AND
CONS
ON 91-105 (1947).
110 United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031 (1941); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U. S. 649, 64 Sup. Ct. 757 (1944); Rice v. Elmore, 72 F. Supp. 516 (E. D. S. C.
1947), aff'd, 165 F. 2d 387 (C. C. A. 4th 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 875, 68 Sup. Ct.
905 (1948).
111 333 U. S. 875, 68 Sup. Ct. 905 (1948).
112 165 F. 2d 387 (C. C. A. 4th 1947).
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which may exclude Negroes by club rules, even though the legislature
statutes dealing with primary elections.1 '
*hadIt repealed
is worth all
recalling once more than whenever the role of the
courts
in protecting civil liberties is discussed-and however significant that
role may be-it should never be forgotten that the litigation process
is a severely limited one, and that there are a great many things
in the field of civil liberties that courts will not or cannot do. They
cannot, for example, protect academic freedom. Today, as our nation becomes more and more a garrison state, in a world dominated by two superpowers separated by iron and silken curtains, the
imperious demands of security exert pressure on many of our most
cherished concepts and traditions. And at some critical points, the courts
are helpless to intervene. What can the courts do, for example, about
the notion of the House Un-American Activities Committee that advocacy
of a world state is a subversive activity? Ten years of probing, hearings,
frenzied publicity, besmirched reputations, suicides and buffoonery, in
connection with this Committee, have not yet ripened into a single Supreme Court opinion. Again: public access to public information is
severely circumscribed by the fact that the service departments of the
federal government have unlimited powers of labelling information or
documents "classified," the publication of which is a crime under the
Espionage Act. The Atomic Energy Commission has similar powers, and
the divulgence of its "restricted data" may be punished by life imprisonment or death. The judicial writs do not run in this territory. It is believed that university courses in nuclear physics are getting badly out-ofdate: what can the courts do about that? There is a tremendous loyalty
purge going on in the public service. Here too the judicial power may not
enter. In the arsenal of democracy, recourse to the courts is important
and valuable, but it is only one of several major weapons. Concern with
what judges do and say should never be permitted to obscure the whole,
complicated mosaic of government by the people for freedom.
113 Early in the current term, however, on October 21, 1948, in MacDougall v. Green,
69 Sup. Ct. 1 (1948), the Court refused to hold unconstitutional an Illinois law which
decrees that a petition to form a new political party must be signed by at least 25,000
qualified voters, provided that this includes 200 signatures from each of at least 50
counties. It is interesting to recall that the plaintiff, MacDougall, the Progressive Party
candidate for Senator, and the defendant Green, the Republican governor, agreed that the
statute was unconstitutional, but fortunately for President Truman, the Supreme Court
did not feel tied to the views expressed by counsel.

